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Abstract 
 
The question addressed by this research was, “When structural circumstances make 
revolutionary action likely, under what conditions will a cooptation strategy prevent subordinate 
revolts?” Experimental procedures established a group status hierarchy consisting of a leader and 
two subordinates. Groups earned collective outcomes, and the leader usurped an inequitable 
portion of these outcomes. In this context, the first experiment shows that a cooptation strategy 
(i.e., offer of a promotion to one of two subordinates) inhibits subordinate revolts. Two 
additional experiments indicate that the cooptation strategy is most effective (a) if the offer 
(strategy) provides the target of cooptation a source of personal gain; (b) if the offer (strategy) is 
a result of the leader’s own volition, rather than situational constraints; and (c) if the leader 
conveys a strong commitment to follow through on the promotion offer. The results are 
interpreted with reference to subjective-expected-utility and reciprocity theories. 
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Research on coalition formation reveals two distinct foci—coalition-choice and 
coalition-mobilization. Coalition-choice research is illustrated by studies of how persons in 
competitive settings choose between alternative coalitions (for reviews see Chertkoff, 1970; 
Gamson, 1964; Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973; Vinacke, 1969). In such research, coalitions are 
usually necessary for persons to obtain outcomes; consequently, the major research question is, 
“Which coalitions will form if three or more parties are confronted with various coalition 
options?” 
The present research falls within the coalition-mobilization rubric. Coalition-mobilization 
research is different from coalition-choice research in that it focuses on the mobilization of 
revolutionary coalitions in cooperative group settings (e.g., Lawler, 1975a, 1975b; Michener & 
Lawler, 1971; Michener & Lyons, 1972; Webster & Smith, 1978). Revolutionary coalitions are 
broadly defined as any revolt involving joint action by two or more subordinates against a leader 
(e.g., Caplow, 1968; Lawler, 1975a, 1975b; Michener & Lawler, 1971). The basic research 
question in coalition-mobilization research is, “Under what conditions will subordinates coalesce 
against a group leader?” 
Studies of subordinate revolts have identified several factors, such as inequitable pay 
rates and group failure, that engender insurgent action (Hamblin, 1958; Lawler, 1975a, 1975b; 
Michener & Lawler, 1971; Michener & Lyons, 1972; Ross, Thibaut, & Evenbeck, 1971). 
However, little attention has been directed at the conditions under which a leader’s use of 
particular strategies can prevent a revolt. While leaders usually have a range of strategy options, 
one common strategy is for leaders to offer inducements (e.g., promotions, pay raises, political 
patronage) to some, but not all, subordinates. This inducement strategy, often termed cooptation, 
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is the focus of the present research.3 The present study creates circumstances (i.e., inequitable 
pay rates) that are favorable to subordinate revolts and examines whether (and under what 
conditions) a cooptation strategy will forestall insurgent behavior. 
The cooptation strategy should inhibit coalitional action, because in response 
subordinates are likely to attribute divergent rewards or costs to an insurgent coalition (Gamson, 
1968; Simmel, 1950). Specifically, the recipient of the inducement offer (the target) should 
expect less personal gain from the coalition than the other subordinate (the nontarget). This is 
important because a central tenet of both macrosociological and social psychological theories is 
that potential allies must have sufficiently common interests in order to mobilize joint action. 
This is suggested by Dahrendorfs (1959) macrosociological analysis of conditions under which 
subordinate “quasi groups” develop “interest groups” (i.e., coalitions explicitly organized to 
influence leaders), and also by Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) notion that a “correspondence of 
outcomes” (i.e., similar rewards and costs) is necessary for coalitional action. Moreover, 
experimental evidence demonstrates that common interests and opinions facilitate coalition 
mobilization (Lawler, 1975a, 1975b; Lawler & Youngs, 1975; Michener & Lyons, 1972; Nitz & 
Phillips, 1969). Based on this diverse literature, the cooptation strategy should weaken 
                                                          
3 3While the term “cooptation” has been used in various ways, that it is an inducement, rather 
than a constraint or persuasion, tactic is a commonality of prior treatments (see Gamson, 1968; 
Mills, 1956; Selznick, 1949). Case study material further suggests that this strategy can take two 
major forms (Coleman, 1957; Gamson, 1968; Selznick, 1949; Simmel, 1950). First of all, it may 
refer to attempts to absorb all dissident individuals or groups into an organization. Gamson 
(1968) has labeled this nonselective cooptation. Alternatively, cooptation may be a “divide and 
rule” tactic involving inducement offers to only some of the dissident individuals or groups. 
Gamson (1968) terms this selective cooptation. The present research examines the latter form of 
cooptation, and is concerned primarily with the reaction of the target (i.e., person) to whom the 
cooptation strategy is directed. 
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subordinates’ common interests (i.e., produce divergent expectations of individual gain) and 
reduce coalitional action against the leader. 
Three experiments are reported below. In all experiments, the cooptation strategy is a 
promotion offer to one of two subordinates. The first experiment provides an initial test of the 
cooptation effect on subordinate coalitions. The second and third experiments focus on the target 
of cooptation in order to identify conditions under which cooptation varies in effectiveness. 
Specifically, the second experiment examines whether the perquisites provided by the promotion 
and the reciprocity norm affect cooptation success. The third experiment examines the target’s 
response to a strong vs. a weak leader commitment to follow through on the promotion offer. 
 
Experiment I 
 
This experiment tests the effect of cooptation by comparing a cooptation- strategy 
condition with a control group. The leader establishes inequitable pay rates in both conditions, 
and the control group is virtually identical to the inequity condition in a prior experiment 
showing high coalition rates (Lawler, 1975a). Questionnaire data on expected gain from the 
coalition and promotion as well as data from subordinates’ negotiations will examine the 
interest-weakening interpretation. 
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Method 
 
Subjects and Setting 
 
Forty triads, each consisting of two subjects (i.e., subordinates) and one confederate (i.e., 
leader), were randomly assigned to either the control or cooptation condition (20 groups/cell). 
Male volunteers at the University of Iowa served as subjects and confederates. 
The setting for this research is similar to that used in prior research on revolutionary 
coalitions (Lawler, 1975a, 1975b; Michener & Lawler, 1971; Michener & Lyons, 1972). The 
instructions portrayed the research as a study of group problem-solving in which the amount of 
money a group earns depends on its task performance. Subjects were told that their group’s 
success would be enhanced by placing the person with the greatest task ability in a high status 
(leader) position, and by giving that person prerogatives like those available to leaders in natural 
settings (e.g., greater influence over task decisions and the discretion to set pay rates). The 
prerogatives of the leader provided a justification for giving subordinates a coalition option. 
 
Procedures 
 
Subjects and confederates were initially placed in separate rooms and given Part One of 
the written instructions, introducing the experiment as a study of how problems are solved when 
there is limited communication between group members. The task confronting subjects was to 
estimate the proportion of darkened area on black and white cards. To facilitate subjects’ task 
involvement, the instructions noted that performance on the task was a good indicator of a 
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person’s cognitive and analytic ability. Prior research suggests that this task is ambiguous 
enough to permit fictitious feedback (Lawler, 1975a, 1975b; Michener & Lawler, 1971; 
Michener & Lyons, 1972). 
The instructions told subjects that their group could earn money depending on their 
overall task performance, and explained that in many settings groups do poorly simply because 
those persons with the most status and influence over group decisions are not the most qualified 
persons in the group. Therefore, to facilitate the group’s success, subjects would take a judgment 
test to assess their task ability and to assign status levels to group members. 
After reading Part One of the instructions, subjects (and the confederate) were placed in 
one room to take the test. This was the only face-to-face contact subjects had with each other or 
with the confederate. After completing the test, they returned to their private rooms and awaited 
the test results. At this point, the confederate secretly departed, and all further communication 
from the confederate (i.e., leader) was fabricated by the experimenter. The brief presence of the 
confederate served to verify for subjects the existence of three group members. 
Spurious test feedback assigned each person a status weight which allegedly symbolized 
their relative task ability. The status weights were presented as percents and totalled 100%. In 
both conditions, the confederate achieved the highest status weight (40%) while subjects 
achieved lower status. The status weights ostensibly represented the weight to be given each 
person’s judgment when group scores were computed. Consistent with other research using these 
procedures (Lawler, 1975a, 1975b), subordinates felt they should receive less of the group 
winnings than the leader (𝑝𝑝 <  .001) and that the leader’s share should approximate the leader’s 
status weight (40%). 
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While awaiting test results, subjects read additional instructions which explained the 
prerogatives of the leader. The instructions indicated that the leader had the greatest influence 
over the group decisions as well as the prerogative of setting pay rates. The leader had complete 
discretion over the reward distribution, meaning the leader could conceivably give all of the 
winnings to other group members or even keep all of the winnings. 
These prerogatives of the leader placed subordinates in an inferior power position, and 
this served as a rationale for including a coalition option. The instructions informed subjects that 
they had less influence than the leader over the task decisions and little influence over the 
distribution of the collective rewards. The instructions suggested that given the leader’s power, 
the availability of a coalition option might assure subordinates of some influence in the group. 
A coalition was a formal agreement which could destroy up to 50% of the leader’s 
winnings, but could not change the leader’s status or deprive him of the prerogative of allocating 
the group winnings in the future. The coalition was an outcome-blockage tactic (Michener & 
Suchner, 1972); thus, money destroyed by the coalition was not transferred to the subordinates.4 
In the cooptation condition, the instructions presented an additional prerogative of the 
leader—the discretion to promote either subordinate to the position of advisor. Appointment of 
an advisor transferred part of the leader’s control over the group winnings to the advisor, by 
giving the promoted person an additional portion of the group’s earnings which he could 
distribute among group members. The advisor position provided one subordinate access to 
                                                          
4 Strikes, work slowdowns, and “sick-ins” exemplify the use of blockage coalitions in natural 
settings, because such alliances typically block the outcomes of authorities without assuring 
subordinates a redistribution of relevant resources. The effect of such coalitions on subordinates’ 
outcomes depends on how authorities respond to the tactic, and this response may involve 
making concessions to insurgents, retaliating against them, or simply ignoring them. The 
blockage coalitions in this experiment are generally isomorphic with such “natural setting” 
alliances. 
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greater personal rewards as well as greater influence over reward allocations. (This section of the 
instructions was deleted in the control condition.)5 
 
Trial Sequence 
 
The experiment consisted of one trial, but subjects believed there were four. Telling 
subjects there were more trials was important because it encouraged them to consider the long-
term consequences of coalitional action including the prospect of leader retaliation. The 
experimenter remained unaware of the treatment until just before the trial and, throughout the 
experiment, communication to the subjects followed a standard script. 
The trial began with subjects judging five black and white cards, while in separate rooms. 
Next, the experimenter collected these individual judgments and ostensibly combined them into 
a group score allocating influence proportional to the status weights (i.e., task ability). 
Four minutes later, the experimenter announced (over the intercom) that the group 
achieved a high level of success (i.e., $1.65 out of a possible $1.85). At this point, the 
experimenter told the leader (over the intercom so subjects could hear) to complete the “money 
distribution form.” After waiting a few minutes, the experimenter then gave this prefabricated 
                                                          
5 The control group, therefore, did not provide a promotion capability to the leader. This is 
appropriate for a number of reasons. First, the control group is virtually identical to the inequity 
condition in the Lawler (1975a) study and thereby provides a direct link with that study. Second, 
another experiment on cooptation shows that the rate of coalition formation in a control group 
with the promotion capability is nearly the same as in the present study’s control group (Lawler 
& Thompson, 1976). Third, in any case, the clearest baseline for the present study is a condition 
without the promotion capability, because coalition formation in the control group should be 
clearly attributable to the inequity. If the control condition provided a promotion capability, 
coalition formation in this condition might be partly attributable to the mere fact that the leader 
failed to use the promotion capability. 
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form to subordinates. Across all conditions, the leader expropriated 60% of the winnings, 
compared with 40% legitimized by his status weight, and gave each subordinate 10% less than 
legitimized by their status. 
The “money distribution form” also contained the cooptation manipulation. In the 
cooptation condition, the following message (written in longhand) was at the bottom of the 
money distribution form: “I’ll pick [target] if you don’t form a coalition.” Both subordinates 
received the message and understood that any offer on this form was not binding and could be 
withdrawn. The leader allegedly made the final decision on whether to appoint an advisor at the 
end of the trial. If the leader promoted someone, he would have to give the advisor between 35^ 
and 554 of the next trial’s winnings which that person could distribute on the next (nonexistent) 
trial. An advisor appointment did not take effect until the next trial, so the target could not alter 
the trial one distribution of winnings via the advisor position. 
Questionnaire and interaction data. After subjects digested the information on the money 
distribution form, they completed the mid-questionnaire which contained items on a variety of 
topics and included measures of expected gain from the coalition and from the prospective 
promotion. Upon completion of this questionnaire, subordinates could discuss the progress of the 
group and negotiate a coalition agreement. Unbeknownst to subjects, the discussions were taped. 
The length of the discussion was recorded, and two persons who were unaware of the hypothesis 
coded the proposals made by each subordinate with high intercoder reliability (i.e., coders’ data 
correlated from .95 to 1.0). 
Coalition formation. To establish a coalition, subjects had to sign a “coalition form” and 
specify the percent reduction in the leader’s winnings. The frequency of coalition formation is 
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the major dependent variable. After the discussion period, subjects were debriefed and paid 
$2.00. 
Results 
 
The modified 2-test for proportions, suggested by Langer and Abelson (1972), is used to 
analyze the binary formation data. This procedure essentially involves a 𝑍𝑍-test on the arcsine-
transformed proportions. As predicted, the cooptation strategy forestalls insurgent coalitions. In 
the control condition, 80% of the groups formed coalitions; while only 20% formed in the 
cooptation condition, 𝑍𝑍 =  4.07, 𝑝𝑝 <  .001, two-tailed. 
 
Expectations of Gain 
 
Questionnaire data support the notion that cooptation weakened the common interests of 
subordinates. A questionnaire item asked subjects how much they would personally expect to 
gain or lose from a coalition (response scale: 1 to 9). As predicted, the cooptive strategy reduced 
the target’s expected gain from a coalition, 𝐹𝐹(1,39)  =  6.15,𝑝𝑝 < .025 (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 =  6.1 vs. 4.6) but 
not the nontarget’s,𝐹𝐹 < 1 (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 =  6.4 vs. 6.1). 
In the cooptation condition, an additional question asked subjects to estimate their 
personal gain from the leader’s promotion offer, and this allows a comparison of expected gain 
from coalition vs. expected gain from promotion for each subordinate. These results indicate that 
the target expected more gain from the promotion (𝑀𝑀 =  6.2) than from a coalition (𝑀𝑀 = 4.6), 𝑡𝑡 = 2.69, 𝑝𝑝 < .02, two-tailed; in contrast, the nontarget expected more gain from a 
coalition (𝑀𝑀 = 6.1) than from the target’s promotion (𝑀𝑀 = 4.2), 𝑡𝑡 =  3.64,𝑝𝑝 <  .01, two-
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tailed. Thus, in the cooptation condition, the target viewed the coalition as contrary to his own 
interests, while the nontarget saw the coalition option as more favorable to his interests. 
 
Interaction Data 
 
Data from the subordinate discussions provide information on the decisionmaking 
processes preventing (or leading to) coalitions. Consistent with the interest-weakening 
interpretation, (a) it took longer for subordinates to reach agreement in the cooptation condition 
than in the control condition, 𝑡𝑡 = 2.20,𝑝𝑝 <  .05, two-tailed (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 =  2: 17 minutes vs. 1: 29 minutes); and, (b) within the cooptation condition, the target played the major role in 
preventing coalitions. 
The role of the target is shown by data on the first proposal (anti- vs. pro-coalition) in the 
discussions within the cooptation condition. When the target made the first proposal, it was 
always anti-coalition, while it was more likely to be pro-coalition if made by the nontarget, 
Fischer’s exact 𝑝𝑝 <  .025. The decision-making pattern in two-thirds of the cases where 
coalitions did not form was that the target made an initial anti-coalition proposal, and the 
nontarget acquiesced usually after some resistance (i.e., questioning the proposal or overt 
disagreement). In contrast, the decision-making pattern in all four cases of coalition formation 
was that the nontarget made an initial pro-coalition proposal, and the target acquiesced after 
some resistance. In sum, it was primarily the target who was responsible for preventing 
coalitions in the cooptation condition. 
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Discussion 
 
The first experiment demonstrates that the cooptation strategy prevents subordinate 
revolts under circumstances (i.e., inequity) that normally produce such action (Lawler, 1975a; 
Ross, Thibaut, & Evenbeck, 1971). Questionnaire and interaction data tend to support an 
interest-weakening interpretation and suggest that the response of the target was the major basis 
for cooptation success. In contrast to the nontarget, the target expected more personal gain from 
the promotion than from a revolt. Furthermore, the target generally prevented the coalition by 
making anti-coalition proposals and persuading the nontarget to accept his view. The target’s 
influence might be attributed to the fact that the promotion offer gave him, but not the nontarget, 
an alternative outcome source. Research shows that outcome alternatives are a source of power 
and influence (e.g., Bacharach & Lawler, 1976; Burgess & Nielson, 1974). 
 
 
Experiment II 
 
The second experiment focuses on the reaction of the target and investigates further 
issues raised by the first experiment. The first issue concerns the perquisites attached to the 
advisor position. In Experiment I, the promotion provided monetary outcomes to the target as 
well as a structural opportunity for the target to share these outcomes with the nontarget. These 
perquisites raise two specific questions: (1) Will the cooptation strategy still be effective if the 
promotion does not entail an increase in outcomes? This is important because it is conceivable 
that the symbolic (i.e., token) aspects of the promotion are sufficient to induce the target to 
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oppose an insurgent coalition. (2) If there is no structural opportunity for the target to share the 
advisor outcomes with the nontarget, will the cooptation strategy be less effective? This is 
important because the target’s receptivity to the cooptation offer may be lodged in the fact that 
the promotion provides an opportunity to allocate outcomes to both himself and the nontarget. 
To investigate these questions, three advisor-perquisite conditions are included in the 
second experiment: a no-gain control group where the advisor position is only symbolic; a share 
condition where the advisor position provides an opportunity for the target to share the outcomes 
with the nontarget as in Experiment I; and, a bonus condition where the advisor outcomes cannot 
be shared by the target. If the symbolic aspects of a promotion are insufficient to engender 
cooptation success, then the target should make more coalition proposals in the control than in 
the combined bonus and share conditions. If the opportunity to share outcomes is important for 
cooptation success, then the target should make fewer coalition proposals in the share than in the 
bonus condition. 
The second issue addressed by Experiment II is whether the reciprocity norm facilitates 
cooptation success. The target of cooptation may see the promotion offer as a conciliatory 
gesture and feel some obligation to reciprocate by not forming a coalition. This is plausible given 
that research in other settings documents the tendency of persons to reciprocate concessions, 
particularly when the recipient (target) of a concession is in an inferior power position (Komorita 
& Esser, 1975; Michener, Vaske, Schlenker, Plazewski, & Chapman, 1975). 
Based on bargaining research, the cooptation condition of the first experiment contains 
two elements which may heighten reciprocity: (1) The promotion offer was allegedly a result of 
the leader’s own volition. Research shows that reciprocity is more likely to occur when the 
conciliatory behavior (offer) of another reflects that person’s own volition (Nemeth, 1972). (2) 
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The cooptive offer made the promotion contingent on the target’s opposition to a revolt. 
Gouldner (1960) suggests that contingent benefits or exchanges increase the salience of the 
reciprocity norm, and this notion is supported by prisoner’s-dilemma research indicating that 
contingent cooperation induces more cooperation from another than noncontingent cooperation 
(e.g., Solomon, 1960). Thus, the leader in the first experiment had discretion to determine 
whether an advisor is appointed and to make the promotion contingent on the target’s 
compliance. 
To examine this, the second experiment will include a discretion condition identical to 
the cooptation condition in the first experiment, and a no-discretion condition in which the 
experiment (a) requires an advisor appointment and (b) does not allow the leader to make the 
promotion contingent on the target’s compliance. This admittedly gross comparison should 
provide the strongest possible indication of reciprocity, given prior theory and research 
(Gouldner, 1960; Nemeth, 1972). If the reciprocity norm enhances cooptation success, then the 
target should propose fewer coalitions in the discretion than in the no-discretion condition. 
 
Method 
 
A 3 X 2 factorial design manipulated advisor perquisites (no-gain, bonus, share) and 
leader discretion (no-distretion, discretion). Ninety undergraduate subjects, half males and half 
females, were randomly assigned to experimental conditions. Subjects were run in same-sex 
groups of three. 
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Procedures 
 
A few changes were made in the procedures. First, the experiment was extended to two 
trials, keeping both trials identical to the first experiment. On Trial 1, the leader set the pay rates 
for both Trials 1 and 2 and made the cooptive offer, but the target could not assume the advisor 
position until the third trial. Second, all subjects were assigned to the target role and could 
ostensibly communicate with the nontarget via written messages during the discussion period on 
each trial. The target was allowed (allegedly by chance) to send the first message on both trials. 
The message forms were standardized, such that the target could propose to form or not form a 
coalition for that trial. The mythical nontarget’s reply to these messages was always agreement. 
The dependent variable is the frequency of formation proposals by the target summed over the 
two trials (range: 0 to 2). 
 
Manipulations 
 
Advisor perquisites. The instructions attached different perquisites to the advisor position 
(i.e., the leader did not decide what perquisites were provided by the promotion). In the control 
condition, an advisor could make suggestions to the leader but received no gain; in the bonus 
condition the advisor also got a 504 bonus added to his personal winnings (i.e., could not be 
shared); while in the share condition, the advisor would get 504 which could, at his option, be 
shared with other group members. 
Leader’s discretion. The no-discretion condition required the leader to promote one of 
the subordinates with the choice of who to promote being based on chance. The discretion 
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condition gave the leader complete discretion regarding the appointment of an advisor as in 
Experiment I.6 
 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
 
Results 
 
Table 1 contains the mean number of formation proposals made by the target. The results 
reveal a main effect for advisor perquisites, 𝐹𝐹(2,84)  ==  3.96,𝑝𝑝 <  .023, and leader discretion, 
𝐹𝐹(1,84)  =  11.10,𝑝𝑝 <  .001. Regarding advisor perquisites, orthogonal (-tests further show 
that the rate of coalition proposals is significantly lower in the combined bonus and share 
conditions than in the control (no-gain) condition, 𝑡𝑡 =  2.49,𝑝𝑝 <  .01, two-tailed; while the 
bonus and share conditions do not significantly differ, 𝑓𝑓 <  1. These results indicate that (a) the 
symbolic aspects of the promotion are not sufficient for cooptation success, and (b) the 
cooptation strategy is equally effective regardless of whether the target has the option of sharing 
his gain as advisor with the nontarget subordinate. 
                                                          
6 The leader-discretion manipulation is concerned with the leader’s choice in making an offer, 
however, it is conceivable that the probability of the target actually being promoted (i.e., leader 
following through on the offer) could contaminate the discretion vs. no-discretion comparison. In 
the no-discretion condition, there was a 100% probability that the target would be promoted; 
while the chance of being promoted (given an offer) in the first experiment may be somewhat 
less than 100% because the leader was not bound by the offer and could withdraw it. To assure 
that this did not create an artifact, two variants of the discretion condition were included-one in 
which the contigent offer was binding on the leader (meaning that the leader had to follow 
through if the target complied) and one where the contingent offer was not binding. In both 
discretion conditions, the leader had complete discretion regarding whether to make an offer. 
These two discretion conditions are combined in the analysis because they do not produce any 
differences and the artifact is therefore not a problem. 
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The main effect for leader discretion supports the reciprocity hypothesis. The rate of 
coalition proposals is lower when the prospective promotion is a result of the leader’s own 
volition (discretion) than when the promotion can be attributed to situational constraints. 
The interaction between advisor perquisites and leader discretion does not reach 
statistical significance (𝐹𝐹 =  1.69,𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀), although Table 1 suggests that the effect of advisor 
perquisites is strongest in the discretion condition. An analysis by sex reveals no sex main effects 
or interactions by sex (all 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 <  1). 
 
Discussion 
 
The effect of advisor perquisites has two major implications. First, the cooptation strategy 
is more effective if it provides the target a source of individual gain. Symbolic (no-gain) aspects 
of the promotion inhibit insurgent action less than the prospective outcomes (bonus and share) 
provided by the promotion offer. Second, a structural opportunity for sharing the outcomes with 
fellow subordinates is not essential to coopt the target. If this opportunity for sharing outcomes 
was important, then the target should have opposed a coalition more often in the share than in the 
bonus condition. The results not only show no difference between the bonus and share conditions 
but also reveal a pattern opposite to that suggested by this notion. Overall, it appears that the 
opportunity for sharing outcomes is irrelevant and that the important determinant of cooptation 
success is the prospective gain provided the target. With or without the opportunity to share the 
advisor outcomes, the target is likely to oppose an insurgent coalition if the leader offers a 
promotion that provides a source of meaningful gain. Future research should examine the effects 
of different levels of gain on cooptation success. 
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The effect of the leader discretion supports the hypothesis derived from the reciprocity 
notion. Prior literature suggests that reciprocity is most likely when offers propose a contingent 
exchange of benefits and flow from the person’s own volition (e.g., Gouldner, 1960; Nemeth, 
1972). The present study used this notion to determine whether a cooptation strategy is more 
effective under these circumstances that ostensibly increase reciprocity. In accord with the 
hypothesis, a cooptive offer is more effective when it reflects the leader’s choice rather than 
situational constraints. 
However, while the effect of discretion vs. no-discretion suggests that reciprocity 
enhances cooptation success, this manipulation does not provide information on the relative 
ability of various components of the leader’s discretion to enhance cooptation success. It appears 
that reciprocity is operating, but we can’t determine precisely what produces it. The reason is 
that the reciprocity effect could be due to (a) leader’s discretion to appoint or not appoint an 
advisor, (b) leader’s discretion to decide which subordinate is promoted, and/or (c) leader’s 
discretion regarding the nature of the message. Based on prior research, these components were 
combined to provide the strongest indication of whether reciprocity may facilitate cooptation 
success. The relative contribution of these separate components of leader discretion should be 
considered in future research. 
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Experiment III 
 
Another issue suggested by the first experiment is whether the strength of the leader’s 
commitment affects cooptation success. The cooptation message in Experiment I conveyed a 
relatively strong commitment to actually promote the target (i.e., “I’ll appoint target, if...”); and 
this experiment will test the hypothesis that messages which convey a strong (deterministic) 
commitment will be more likely to reduce the target’s coalition proposals than messages which 
convey a weaker (probabilistic) commitment (e.g., Schelling, 1960; Tedeschi, 1970). 
 
Method 
 
Thirty-six male subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (12/cell): 
strong commitment (“If you don’t form a coalition, I’ll definitely appoint. . .”); weak 
commitment (“If you don’t form a coalition, I might appoint. . .”); or a control group (identical to 
the control group in the first experiment). All subjects were placed in the target role, and the 
procedures were the same as the second experiment except that this was a one-trial experiment. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The results replicate and extend the first experiment. Ninety-two percent of the control 
subjects proposed a revolt, while 75% of targets receiving the weak (probabilistic) message and 
42% of the targets receiving the strong (deterministic) message proposed a revolt. A comparison 
of each commitment condition with the control group, using the Langer and Abelson (1972) 
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modified 𝑍𝑍-test (for binary dependent variables), shows that the strong commitment significantly 
reduced coalition behavior, 𝑍𝑍 =  2.84,𝑝𝑝 <  .01, two-tailed, but the weak commitment did not, 
𝑍𝑍 <  1. A direct comparison of the strong and weak messages reveals a marginally significant 
tendency for strong messages to produce less coalition behavior than weak messages, 𝑍𝑍 = 1.68,𝑝𝑝 <  .10, two-tailed. 
Overall, the third experiment shows that the cooptation strategy is effective primarily 
when the leader conveys a strong commitment to follow through on the offer. The finding are 
consistent with theoretical treatments of probabilistic vs. deterministic messages and suggest that 
the likelihood of actually receiving the promotion affects the target’s response to the strategy 
(Schelling, 1960; Tedeschi, 1970). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Theory and research on subordinate revolts has identified various structural conditions 
that engender insurgent behavior (e.g., Dahrendorf, 1959; Hamblin, 1958; Lawler, 1975a, 1975b; 
Ross et al., 1971). The initial hypothesis of the present research was that a cooptation strategy 
(involving a promotion offer) would forestall revolts. The research supports this hypothesis and 
suggests that the cooptation strategy is most effective under the following conditions: (1) if the 
perquisites associated with the promotion provide the target a source of personal gain (with or 
without the opportunity to share the outcomes with a fellow subordinate); (2) if the offer conveys 
a strong leader commitment to follow through on the promotion; (3) if the promotion reflects the 
choice or discretion of the leader rather than situational constraints. Thus, a leader who wants to 
prevent a revolt via a promotion strategy can maximize success by offering a position which has 
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more than symbolic import, communicating a strong commitment to the promotion, and 
emphasizing or exaggerating his personal responsibility for the promotion. 
The implications of the research can be further elaborated by placing the findings within 
a larger theoretical context. Two theoretical constructs appear to be important: subjective-
expected-utility (SEU) and reciprocity. The impact of advisor perquisites and the leader’s 
commitment can be interpreted within the SEU framework. The SEU model posits that any 
choice is a function of the magnitude of gain, weighted by the probability, attached to the choice 
(Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1973). Applied to the present research, the likelihood of the 
target opposing the insurgent coalition should depend on the magnitude X the probability of gain 
from the promotion minus the magnitude X the probability of gain from the coalition. While the 
present research did not explicitly manipulate these variables, the findings demonstrate that 
targets attributed more gain to the promotion than to the coalition (Experiment 1), and suggest 
that the magnitude of gain from the promotion (advisor perquisites) as well as the probability 
(leader commitment) of receiving the promotion affect cooptation success in a manner consistent 
with the SEU model. Future research should extend the implications of SEU by manipulating the 
nature of the coalition option. The SEU model suggests that different types or levels of coalition 
power will also bear on cooptation success. 
The impact of leader discretion regarding promotion can be interpreted by reciprocity 
“theory.” As a theory, reciprocity is relatively undeveloped, but extant treatments of it suggest 
that reciprocity would be more likely in circumstances encompassed by the leader-discretion 
condition (Gouldner, 1960; Nemeth, 1972). In this sense, reciprocity provides a plausible 
interpretation for lower coalition proposals under leader discretion. The results support the 
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notion that the reciprocation of conciliatory behavior is more likely when the other’s behavior or 
offer is contingent and freely undertaken (Gouldner, 1960; Nemeth, 1972). 
To conclude, this research experimentally tested the impact of a cooptation strategy on 
insurgent behavior and identified some conditions under which the strategy varies in 
effectiveness. Based on the research, it appears that two separate theoretical constructs provide a 
useful foundation for future research: subjective-expected-utility and reciprocity. Research 
should further examine the implications of these theoretical constructs for cooptation success and 
consider the interrelationship between them. Reciprocity can have either (or both) normative and 
utilitarian implications, and future research should ferret out these disparate implications. 
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